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Our Internet survey yielded a robust difference among
neurodiverse and neurotypical persons in the
interpretation of eyes, write Gerit Pfuhl and Leif Ekblad.
BY: Gerit Pfuhl and Leif Ekblad
Understanding and expressing emotions comes naturally to
humans, and emotion processing plays a fundamental role in
explaining the behavior of others (Olsson & Ochsner, 2007).
Expression and recognition of emotions, regardless of the modality
used, facilitates normal social interaction. Accordingly, differences in
emotion processing, by either expressing them or interpreting them
differently, can lead to misunderstandings and social withdrawal.
Indeed, training emotion recognition improves social skills (e.g., Rice
et al., 2015). The group most studied consists of people with an
autism spectrum diagnosis (ASD). These individuals are, by
definition (DSM-V, American Psychiatric Association, 2013),
characterized as having difficulties in using, sharing and responding
to emotions. Furthermore, persons diagnosed with ASD are a)
impaired in the ability to communicate, b) deficient in understanding
social interactions, and c) likely to show repetitive behaviors or
restricted interests (DSM-V, American Psychiatric Association,
2013). This is a definition by three core traits.
However, Happé, Ronald, and Plomin (2006) reported that children
on the autistic spectrum and controls do not fall into two distinct
clusters. Rather, autism is merely the extreme end of a unimodal
distribution along each of the three core traits, implying that the
dividing line is arbitrary. Not only that, but the three core traits are
only weakly correlated, suggesting that the definition of autism that
requires the presence of all three traits is less driven by data than by
the coincidence of all three traits being conspicuous. This suggests
that a) some people who are not diagnosed with autism also have
difficulties in emotion processing, and b) some people with autism
may not have severe problems with emotion processing.
Given that autistic traits are a continuum ( Bailey, Palferman,
Heavey, & Le Couteur, 1998; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a; Happé et
al., 2006; Lundström et al., 2012), it is not ideal to dichotomize
participants based on a formal diagnosis that itself rests on three
core traits. As we will review below, the inconsistent literature on
emotion processing in autism may be due to small sample sizes in
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the studies, the individual symptom severity along the three core
traits for each participant, and a normative view based on “healthy
controls.”
Here we first briefly present the neurodiversity concept. We then
review briefly the emotion processing literature in autism. Next, we
present a study with more than 10,000 participants who provided
mental state descriptors for eye stimuli. Through an iterative process,
we have derived new mental state descriptors that allow to measure
the bias a person has in interpreting these eye stimuli.
The neurodiversity concept
Autistic traits are a quantitative, not a qualitative, difference in the
general population (Bailey et al., 1998; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a;
Happé et al., 2006; Lundström et al., 2012). Happé et al. (2006)
argued for a continuum in the general population based on
questionnaires sent out to parents of twins (Ronald, Happé, &
Plomin, 2005). This argument was also supported by another large
twin study where parents of Swedish twins were interviewed
(Lundström et al., 2012). Relatives of diagnosed persons with
autism do show above average systemizing and below average
empathizing compared to matched unaffected families (Grove et al.
2013). Further, mild expression of autistic traits can be
advantageous. For example, many mathematicians score high on
autistic traits (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a). It is in this vein that some
of the people with high-functioning autism (HFA) prefer to define
themselves not as ill but rather as neurodiverse (Griffin & Pollak,
2009; Jaarsma & Welin, 2012 ).
The concept of neurodiversity is not limited to autism. Persons with
ADHD, dyslexia, and dyspraxia may also refer to themselves as
neurodiverse. Thus, neurodiversity stands for everything but having
a disease or disorder and being inferior to others (Kapp et al., 2013).
Accordingly, Ekblad (2013) developed a questionnaire that
measures neurodiversity (ND) and neurotypicality (NT). Using the
terms neurodiverse and neurotypical avoids referencing someone as
a person with autism, Asperger syndrome, or healthy, especially
since there is no “healthy” within personality psychology. We will use
this neurodiverse/neurotypical questionnaire to measure where
along the continuum a person lies.
Emotion processing and autistic traits
The basic emotions (i.e., happy, sad, fearful, angry, disgusted, and
surprised) are thought to be universally transmitted and understood
(Ekman, 2003; but see Russell, 1994). Uljarevic and Hamilton
(2013) found only marginal impairments in detecting sadness,
anger, surprise, fear, and disgust but no difference for happiness
among persons with autism. In a recent review, Nuske, Vivanti, and
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Dissanayake (2013) concluded that emotion impairments are neither
universal nor specific to autism. This conclusion is not surprising
given that deficit in emotion processing is just one of the symptoms
of autism and is shared with other mental disorders or vulnerabilities
toward them (e.g., schizophrenia, depression) (Leppänen, 2006;
Trémeau, 2006).
Similarly, in a review by Harms, Martin, and Wallace ( 2010), data on
facial emotion recognition impairments was found to be inconsistent.
Compensatory mechanisms may allow normative performance.
Indeed, in the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test (RMET) Miu,
Pana, and Avram (2012) found no difference in the accuracy, but
they did find a longer response time in selecting the best fitting
emotion to the eyes among a population of students classified as
either high in autistic traits or low. Related results have been found
when basic emotions had to be matched to an entire face, as with
the Karolinska directed emotional faces task. Here, Sucksmith et al.
(2013) found a longer response time in persons with autism but not
in their parents and healthy controls. They also found that persons
with autism had a lower accuracy than the other two groups, and
there was a significant correlation with the Emotional Quotient. A
lower accuracy for the ASD group was also found when stimuli were
presented only briefly, 250 ms (Walsh, Creighton, & Rutherford,
2016). The authors used complex expressions like arrogant, bored,
flirtatious, and thoughtful. However, in another study, Tracy et al.
(2011) found no difference among children with and without autism
on accuracy or speed in recognizing basic and complex emotions.
These contradictory results might be due to individual differences in
eye fixation. Kirchner et al. (2011) report that people with ASD who
spent more time looking at the eyes performed better on the RMET,
but eye fixation time was not correlated with autism severity as
measured with the ADI-R.
These data suggest impairments in emotion recognition in people
with ASD, but they also indicate that the tasks used are not sensitive
enough to measure emotion recognition reliably. This might be due,
on the one hand, to the ASD group being heterogeneous, since the
standard deviation in the ASD group is often larger than it is in the
control group. On the other hand, it might be attributable to
measuring performance only instead of including a measure of bias.
Comparing people with autism to “healthy controls” is a performance
measurement (i.e., the score of the healthy controls serves as a
benchmark). That is prominently the case in the RMET. The test was
developed by selecting the answer options of non-autistic students
as “correct” despite there being no correct answer per se (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001a).
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Answering a task is also influenced by cognitive biases. An example
is the familiarity bias. The people we see most often are very familiar
to us and also perceived as more beautiful (i.e., our own children,
parents, spouse) (Peskin & Newell, 2004). Instead of familiarity, the
RMET has been analyzed for bias based on the valence of the
stimuli. In the meta-analysis of Richman and Unoka (2015), people
with major depression had a lower overall accuracy score, mainly
driven by errors on positive items (positive valence). This takeaway
is in agreement with other behavioral tasks finding a negativity bias
or absence of a positivity bias in people with depression (Peckham,
McHugh, & Otto, 2010).
Given the inconsistent results on emotion recognition tasks (Harms
et al., 2010), we set out to modify the RMET to assess performance
and bias along the autism continuum. We expected a stronger
discrepancy between the groups by selecting new emotional
expressions through an iterative process among humans who varied
in the amount of their autistic traits. Further, instead of using a
performance benchmark (correct/incorrect), we provide a different
scoring validated on over 2,000 people. This scoring classifies
responses as either more autistic/neurodiverse (see below) or more
neurotypical-like. This score is a bias measure.
Method
Over 10,000 persons participated in four online surveys hosted at
the Aspie Quiz website (http://rdos.net/eng) and at Qualtrics
(Qualtrics.com). Participants were asked to choose their gender and
state of residence, whether they have been diagnosed with
AS/HFA/PDD or are suspected of belonging to this group, or to state
that they do not have any known developmental disorder. Their birth
year was also asked for, but some participants did not select a
sensible birth year. Rather, they picked one of the first years in the
list that started at 1900. Since diagnosis was not verified by a
clinician, we are not using this response as a grouping factor.
Instead, we are solely using a person’s Aspie Quiz score. This score
correlates highly with the Autism Quotient score (Ekblad, 2013).
Hence, the experiments primarily used the ND and NT group
classification, which a) had well-documented properties by using the
Aspie Quiz scoring system, and b) did not rely on a single statement.
Approximately 5% to 10% of the participants per task indicated to be
diagnosed with autism. About 50% of the participants were from the
USA, and the rest were mostly from Europe and Australia.
Compliance with ethical standards
The studies comply with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later
amendments or comparable ethical standards. The studies were
constructed in such a way that participants could not be identified
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(i.e., no IP address was registered). Participants were informed
about the objectives of the study, and informed consent was
obtained from all participants before taking the test. Research items
in the Aspie Quiz could be skipped by selecting the “?” alternative
(checked by default).
Materials
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RMET).  Baron-Cohen and
colleagues (2001a) presented students a selection of cropped faces
showing mainly the region around the eyes and displaying various
mental states, which they termed the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes
test” (RMET). Through an iterative process, they kept those “eyes”
that had a clear preferred emotional expression (i.e., over twice as
many answers than the other three mental state descriptors
received). It is important to stress that the expression seen on the
pictures had no correct answer per se. After that, the authors
presented this stimulus set to a naïve group of students and adults
who were diagnosed with Asperger syndrome. The latter group
showed a larger spread in their answers and they less often agreed
on the option the student population had agreed upon. We build on
this iterative process for selecting better mental state descriptors.
For the short named “adult version,” we run a version based on 37
eye stimuli and four mental state descriptors. The “child version”
contained 28 eye stimuli with an age-appropriate vocabulary (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001a, 2001b). Twenty-five stimuli are identical
between the two versions and all stimuli are from young to old
Caucasian adults. The adult version also asked for clarity, rated on a
5-point Likert scale from “not very clear” to “very clear.” For the
iterative process (see procedure) we chose the child version,
because we wanted to avoid any influence of verbal intelligence and
English proficiency on the RMET.
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FIGURE 1: 28 stimuli from the child version of the RMET.
The Aspie Quiz. The Aspie Quiz is a questionnaire assessing
autistic-like traits on a scale with the answer options: yes, a little,
and no. At the time of the study it had 150 items. The Aspie Quiz
was validated against Baron-Cohen’s Autism Spectrum Quotient and
scores correlated 0.83 (Ekblad, 2013).
The primary factor in Aspie Quiz was named neurodiversity factor,
and the secondary factor was named neurotypical factor. The
neurodiversity factor measures autistic traits whereas the
neurotypical factor measures non-autistic traits. For classification of
a person into neurotypical and/or neurodiverse, we used the
difference between these two scores. A participant with a score
difference above or equal to 35 was classified as neurodiverse (ND)
(i.e., the autistic-like traits prevail), and someone with a score
difference below or equal to 35 was classified as neurotypical (NT).
Scores in between were classified as mixed. The cutoff was set to




The RMET was presented before proceeding to the Aspie Quiz
items. This order prevented any bias in performing the task due to
one’s score along the neurodiverse/neurotypical continuum.
The optimization of the RMET was done in several steps. In the first
step, the test was run with the four original emotions from the RMET
and an “I don’t know” alternative (final version 2; H9, 2013). In the
next step, an attempt was made to find the emotions that could best
differentiate the neurodiverse and the neurotypical populations from
each other. Emotions were collected from previous research in the
Aspie Quiz about stims (Pfuhl & Ekblad, 2017) and also included all
the original choices, resulting in a list of 85 emotions. First, all the 85
emotions were selectable (final version 2; H10, 2013). Then, 16
emotions, 10 emotions, six emotions, and four emotions (final
version 2; H11-H14, 2013) were selected based on which had the
largest difference between the populations. The idea was to make
the transition to fewer alternatives more gradual so as not to miss
out too early on an emotion when alternatives were reduced.
Subjects also had the option to respond with “I don’t know.”
Data analysis
Participants who answered less than 10 items were excluded. We
used multinomial logistic regression on the original RMET (Tables 2
and 3 in Appendix), the six alternatives version (Table 4 in
Appendix), and the new four alternatives version (Table 5 in
Appendix). The ND/NT score was the sole predictor. The factors age
and gender were not included in the regression models since they
were not of primary interest. We also grouped people based on
diagnosis and their ND/NT score for comparison with previous
studies. The rate of decline was calculated based on the percentage
of “I don’t know” responses for each eye expression. Statistical
significance is reported with Bonferroni-Holm corrected p-values.
Scores for the RMET were calculated in two ways. First, the mental
state descriptor, defined as the correct alternative, was scored as
“1,” and all other answers as “0” for the child and adult RMET. (See
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a, 2001b.) The average was calculated
after excluding “I don’t know” answers (i.e., if a participant selected a
mental state descriptor in 26 cases, the score was based on the sum
divided by 26 to account for that tendency). Guessing would yield
25% correct.
This approach was not possible for the modified versions, which
intentionally had no correct mental state descriptor. Instead, a novel
method of scoring based on the raw data was used. Based on the
1
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multinomial regression analysis, each answer option received a z-
score. (See Tables 2–5 in the Appendix.) A positive z-score
indicated a preference for this mental state descriptor among NDs,
and a negative z-score indicated a preference for that mental state
descriptor among NTs. For each participant, we then summed up




Table 1 gives the number of participants per gender, diagnosis, and
Aspie Quiz classification. Age, country of origin, and ancestry
differed little between the datasets, so averages for all datasets were
calculated. Average age (SD in parenthesis) was 28 (12) years in
the ASD group, 30 (12) years in the ND group, 33 (13) years in the
mixed group, and 35 (13) years in the NT group. Median age was 24
years in the ASD group, 28 years in the ND group, 30 years in the
mixed group, and 32 years in the NT group. Of the participants, 52%
were from the USA, 16% from the UK, 7% from Australia, 6% from
Canada, and 19% from other countries. 80% of the participants had
European ancestry, 5% had Asian, 3% had African, 2% had
American-Indian, and 10% didn’t give or had mixed or other
ancestries.
TABLE 1: Number of participants per gender, diagnosis, and Aspie
Quiz classification.
Performance on the original RMET – adult and child version
Adult version. The average performance of NDs was 66% correct.
Persons with a mixture of both traits had on average 72.5% correct.
The NT group had 77% correct. People indicating that they had been
diagnosed with autism scored lowest with 64% correct. Table 2 (see
Appendix) provides the frequency for each of the mental state
descriptors among the groups and their z-scores; the mixed group is
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not presented. Further, we asked all participants to state the clarity
of the item. Here too, a group difference was found. The ND/ASD
group rated the items as less clear than the NT group, F(3, 3,545) =
68.91, p < .0001, d = .0117. The lowest rating was for item 11 with
2.87 (not part of the child version), and item 37 received the highest
clarity score of 3.79 across all participants.
Child version. The groups differed significantly in the number of
items answered correctly, F(3, 2,439) = 13.00, p < .0001, d = .063
with an average percentage of items correct of 69.3% for people
indicating being diagnosed with autism, 72.3% of items correct for
NDs, 74.1% correct for the mixed group, and 75.3% of items correct
for the NT group. Further, the ND group had on average four “I don’t
know” responses, whereas the NT group had on average 1.5 “I don’t
know” responses. This difference in the number of “I don’t know”
responses was statistically significant, F(3, 2,439) = 34.55, p
< .0001, d = .1. Detailed results are presented in Table 3 (see
Appendix).
Scores based on predefined alternatives were calculated for the
child and adult RMET. Participants’ performance score (ranging from
0% correct to 100% correct) was used to calculate a correlation to
the ND/NT score difference, which resulted in a correlation of
r(2,441) = –.14 for the child RMET and r(3547) = –.26 for the adult
RMET. Scores based on z-values were calculated and correlated to
the ND/NT score difference. This resulted in a correlation of r(2,441)
= .29, p < .001, for the child RMET and r(3,547) = .35, p < .001, for
the adult RMET. That is, the effect size increased from small to
medium by using the z-scores.
Results of the modified RMET
In the new versions emerging from the iterative process, there was
no predefined correct answer. Many facial expressions had different
semantic labels describing internal states and emotions. Firstly,
these versions yielded a similar proportion of “I don’t know” answers
between the groups, p > .05. Notably, NDs chose a negative
connotation (rude, hate, evil, unkind, fake, and plotting) more often
compared to NTs, who interpreted the same eye stimuli as much
more positive (determined, skeptical, serious, dreamy, and playful).
Female eyes were judged as more sexual by NTs, whereas NDs
more often chose for the same stimulus staring.
Next, we looked at the mode of each of those mental state
descriptors per group. In the six-answer option version, the mode
(i.e., the mental state descriptor selected by the majority in each
group) was the same for 14 of the 28 items. These mental state
descriptors never reached over 50% but were always above chance
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level of 16.7%. In the new four-answer option version, the most
chosen mental state descriptor was the same for all groups in 17 out
of the 28 cases, and only once (item 2) did an item reach over 50%
in all groups. Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the frequency
for each mental state descriptor per group (mixed group not shown)
for the six-item and four-item version, respectively.
Next, in the new four-answer version, we calculated a new “correct”
score based on a) the mental state descriptors the NT group had
chosen and b) the mental state descriptors the ND group had
chosen. On average, the NT group had 12.9 items “correct,” the
ASD group had 10.9 items correct, the ND group had 11.2 items
correct, and the mixed group had 12.3 items correct. This group
difference was significant, F(3, 2,412) = 50.72, p < .0001, d = .12. A
similar analysis using the ND modes as “correct” yielded 11.4 items
correct for the ND group, 12 items correct for the mixed group, 12.1
items correct for the NT group, and 11.1 items correct for the ASD
group. This group difference was significant, F(3, 2,414) = 14.28, p
< .0001, d = .07. Note that 17 items are the same in both scorings.
Again, a better discriminator was the z-score for each participant.
Here, the correlation of the z-scores to the ND/NT score yielded far
higher coefficients: r(2,414) = .45 for the six-alternative version and
r(1675) = .41 for the new four-alternative version (i.e., medium to
strong effect sizes).
Discussion
The modified version of the RMET is a sensitive measure for
detecting emotion processing differences along the autistic
spectrum, and it provided larger effect sizes than using the standard
version. The modified RMET is based on a large sample of people
scoring high on autistic traits. This is in contrast to the often small
sample size of laboratory studies (Kirchner et al., 2011; Walsh et al.,
2016; see also Harms et al., 2010). Testing online provides less
control than laboratory testing. However, our task had no correct
answer per se (cheating was not possible) and was completely
voluntary. A recent study used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to see
whether non-student samples and doing the test online reproduces
findings from laboratory tests (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis,
2013). The authors did reproduce the findings from a range of
cognitive tasks, despite the necessity to concentrate and watch
carefully the stimuli on the screen. They also reported that for certain
tasks it was harder to recruit. That is, recruiting is the difficult part not
the attention during the task itself.
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The mental state descriptors found here reflect how those people
interpret the eye stimuli. There is—we have to stress—still no correct
answer. However, through the iterative process and use of the
summed z-score, the ability of the test to discriminate between
persons varying in their degree of autistic traits was markedly
improved from a small effect size to a medium effect size. The
difference is most pronounced for items where “staring” was an
answer option. The ND and NT differed by up to 15%. This was
detectable since we let people on the autistic spectrum chose the
mental state descriptors, which differed from the selection process of
Baron-Cohen et al. (2001a). That is, our iterative process was not
biased towards NTs, and it included a gradual process on which
people along the entire autistic spectrum participated.
The standard version of the RMET requires that participants answer
all items. As such, being unsure forces one to select the best-fitting
response despite such a choice being just slightly favored over the
other options. We had considered providing a ranking scale first. In
other words, participants had to indicate from 1 (highest agreement)
to 4 (lowest agreement) the order of the mental state descriptors.
However, we traded that consideration off against a single answer
option to ensure more participants would score all items. That is, we
included the option to ‘opt out’ by selecting “I don’t know.” That is to
say, we offered an alternative to guessing (Dolnicar & Grün, 2014).
We found a higher prevalence of “I don’t know” responses among
people with autism and the ND group compared to the NT group.
We think this tendency is due to perceived difficulty rather than
motivation. Firstly, the “I don’t know” responses were not clustered
toward the end of a participant’s responses. Secondly, the clarity
scoring also indicated that the higher the autistic traits, the less clear
the stimuli were perceived. Thirdly, when offering new mental state
descriptors, the “I don’t know” responses dropped.
Sawyer, Williamson, and Young (2014) found that people with
Asperger’s disorder opted less for not responding compared to
controls. When not sure which emotion is displayed, NTs withhold
their decision more often than people diagnosed with autism. The
difference was more in the metacognitive ability rather than emotion
processing per se. Furthermore, persons with autism have been
found to be less sensitive to rewards or points (Damiano et al.,
2012) because they engaged more in a physical effort task without
considering the outcomes. Harms et al. (2010) suggested that
previously found inconsistent results in emotion processing in autism
are due to the use of compensatory mechanisms. It has been
suggested that time pressure may increase the group difference. But
here the literature is also mixed.
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Walsh et al. (2016) found an impairment in emotion recognition
when using very short stimulus exposure and no time limit to
respond. Tracy et al. (2011) found similarly fast and accurate
responses among children and adolescents with or without a
diagnosis of ASD. Here, we imposed no incentives, points, or time
pressure. We were genuinely interested in how people perceived the
stimuli. Under optimal conditions and given enough cognitive
resources, performance of people with autism can be similar to that
of NTs (See, for example, Harms et al. 2010.) For example, in the
RMET, additional cognitive effort spent, as seen in longer response
times, yielded no performance difference (Miu et al., 2012). By
offering the option of “I don’t know” we already found a reduced
group difference.
Negativity bias
The modified RMET yielded a very specific bias—a negativity bias.
There was a preference for negative mental state descriptors among
the ND and ASD groups. This might be due to a more pessimistic
view of the world. Indeed, there is a high prevalence of depression
among people with autism (Ghaziuddin, GHaziuddin, & Greden,
2002). It remains to be seen whether this bias is unique for autism or
overlaps with depression or schizophrenia (Leppänen, 2006;
Trémeau, 2006).
Tasks that measure bias can tell us more about the processing
strategy. Such tasks may also allow testing recent computational
models of autism. Van de Cruys et al. (2014) explain the symptoms
of autism with a failure of sensory attenuation. That is, there is an
overweighting of sensory information and reduced influence of
contextual and prior information. This tendency results in large
prediction errors and constant surprise. It also requires the need to
update and relearn because the experience (prior information) is too
weak. But such permanent discrepancy between expectation and
sensory information can lead to frustration and the desire for
predictability. Can one apply this model of failure in sensory
attenuation to the RMET? On the one hand, the RMET is a task of
judging mental states without any contextual information provided.
On the other hand, everyone has preconceived notions about the
human nature in general, a worldview on how nice or nasty people
are. This viewpoint is shaped by experience. Neurotypicals who are
devoid of depression have a positive worldview and are more
optimistic. Hence, they see things more positively (Isaacowitz, 2005;
Peters, Vieler, & Lautenbacher, 2016). People with depression,
though, do perform worse on the RMET (Richman & Unoka; 2015).
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Neurodiverse people may also have a less positive worldview. For
people with autism, this negative worldview may come from the often
frustrating unpredictability experienced in social situations (i.e., they
often err and prefer to avoid such experience subsequently) (van de
Cruys et al., 2014). Indeed, we found that more NDs and people
with autism than NTs preferred not to rate some of the RMET
stimuli.
Social situations are complex situations requiring a lot of cognitive
effort, especially if there is a lack of experience. But this is a vicious
circle for people with autism. The prediction errors they make due to
overweighting of sensory information and too little influence of
experience (or prior worldview) is frustrating rather than rewarding
(made the correct prediction). Instead of increasing the experience
and hence reducing the prediction error, they chose to avoid
exposure to social situations. This decision, in turn, ensures a
steady arousal when again exposed to social situations. Dalton et al.
(2005) found that people with autism were aroused by looking at
faces, but this arousal had a negative valence, seen as
hypoactivation in the amygdala. Thus, the pressure felt to have to
look at a face and judge what it expresses is not preferred. Here,
this negative attitude toward looking at faces was measured and
quantified. It is not a failure in emotion processing capabilities; it is a
bias in choosing more negative attributes, especially staring in the
ND group. Responding with staring may express an avoidance
behavior (i.e., not long looking at the eyes).
Conclusion
Our Internet survey yielded a robust difference among neurodiverse
and neurotypical persons in the interpretation of eyes. This robust
difference is based on studying a large population and avoiding
dichotomization of subjects into typical developing (healthy) humans
and people with autism. That is, the score difference is a continuous
measurement of autistic-like traits. The modified RMET
distinguishes better between people with autism and people scoring
high on neurodiverse and neurotypical traits, respectively. Further,
the modified test reduced guessing because we allowed participants
not to answer. These small procedural differences, no time pressure,
and an ‘opt out’ option yielded important differences in emotion
processing among participants. People with autism and
neurodiverse people selected staring and other negatively connoted
attributes for faces often, whereas neurotypicals showed no
negativity bias. This negativity bias may lead to a vicious circle,
avoiding social contacts instead of training to become better at
social interaction. Since experience plays a crucial role in emotion
processing (Jack & Schyns, 2015; Hartshorne & Germine 2015),
interactions between neurotypicals and people with autism should be
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more frequent, and more time and patience should be afforded to
them. Providing feedback on one’s performance in emotion
recognition has the potential to increase social skills and confidence
in social situations (Rice et al., 2015; Sawyer et al., 2014).
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Abstract
Optimizing the RMET to measure bias not performance
differences
Background: Human social interaction and communication is
complex. Sending a verbal message is often accompanied by
intonations, facial expressions, grimaces, and body postures.
Nonverbal signals are potentially open for misinterpretation. One
popular test for assessing the interpretation of facial expressions is
the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET). This test has been
used to relate Theory of Mind abilities along the autistic spectrum.
However, this test was normed on a small sample of students, and
answers were coded binary as either correct or wrong.
Methods: We recruited from various forums, blogs, and personal
websites over 10,000 people. To assess autistic traits
(neurodiversity), we used the Aspie Quiz, which agrees well with the
AQ test (Ekblad, 2013). Importantly, we included an “I don’t know”
answer option. Further, participants could freely indicate which
emotion they read in the eyes. Applying an iterative process, we
derived alternative mental state descriptors. 
Results and conclusion: This optimized RMET increased the ability
to differentiate between people with few or many autistic traits,
respectively. By using logistic regression, the test is able to measure
difference in bias, not just performance. We found a pronounced
negativity bias among people who scored high on many autistic
traits. This bias may contribute to a vicious circle of avoiding social
interactions.
Keywords: emotion, facial expressions, high-functioning autism,
neurodiversity, nonverbal.
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